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Abstract
Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency
associated with perfectly competitive market outcomes: the “lemons” market. Credible certifi-
cation, that substantiates unobservable characteristics of products that consumers value, is of-
ten considered a potential solution to such market failure. This paper examines welfare effects
of certification in markets in which there is asymmetric information, but without an adverse
selection problem. We analyze the market equilibrium when the certification technology beco-
mes available and contrast this with the equilibrium without certification. We find that despite
an improvement in allocative efficiency, overall welfare may decrease due to the possibility of
certification when such certification is either costly or inaccurate. In fact, most of these results
are not derived from the direct welfare cost of certification, but rather from certification’s effect
on the market(s).
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1 Introduction
Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency as-
sociated with perfectly competitive market outcomes—the “lemons” market (Akerlof, 1970). This
issue has recently regained more detailed scrutiny with the rise of “organic,” “fair trade,” “local,”
“sustainable” etc. products. In markets for such products, the concept of product quality in con-
sumer preferences has extended to include the process of production and distribution. When such
properties are claimed by firms, along with specific corporate philosophies or policies, it is very
hard or impossible for consumers to ascertain the quality or the process of production of those
products even after their consumption experience in many cases. Due to the aforementioned cre-
dence good nature,1 quality assurance mechanisms, such as offering warranties (e.g., see Spence,
1977) and building up a reputation (e.g., see Klein and Leffler, 1981; and Shapiro, 1983), are not
expected to function well to address the information problem in those markets.2 Accordingly,
credible (third-party) certification is often considered the only potential solution for overcoming
informational asymmetries. In addition, while “quality” in the traditional, lemon’s sense (vertical
differentiation) may be hard to measure, consumers’ valuation of the production process, as in
the examples above, makes certification more easily quantifiable. Although the degree to which
such claims are backed up by formal certification or regulated by law varies, various certification
schemes are in use in many marketplaces.
In spite of the seeming attractiveness of credible certification, it is still important to substantiate
whether introducing certification increases or decreases social welfare through a formal analysis,
especially considering its popularity. To this end, in this paper we consider markets in which
goods have unobservable characteristics that consumers value. We analyze the market equili-
brium when a technology is available that credibly verifies the relevant attributes of products
and contrast this with the equilibrium without certification. We assume that the certification
technology could be costly and imperfect. One effect the certification technology has is to po-
tentially create two markets (market segmentation)—one with certified products and the other
without—while without certification there is only one pooled market. As a result, one has to con-
sider both the firm’s decision as to whether to seek certification as well as the consumer’s choice
as to which market to patronize.
We find that certification may be welfare-reducing when the certification technology is costly
or imperfect. This implies that even when the certification technology is perfectly accurate—and
1For more detailed definition and discussion of credence goods see, for example, Darby and Karni (1973) and
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
2See Bonroy and Constantatos (2015) and Dranove and Jin (2010) for detailed discussion on this point.
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therefore is able to resolve informational asymmetries in the market place—overall welfare may
decrease due to the possibility of certification when such certification is costly. Similarly, even
when the certification technology is costless, welfare may decrease when such certification is quite
imperfect.
The underlying reason for this is that while the certification process admits better information
and therefore increases efficiency by reallocating high quality goods to consumers with relatively
higher valuations, it also brings a negative impact on the average quality of non-certified goods.
The latter effect can push some high quality producers out of the non-certified market or the entire
group (a market collapse). In contrast, absent any certification, the increased presence of products
with desirable characteristics provide a sufficiently strong positive externality to sustain an equili-
brium that entails a larger number of high-quality products. When the certification technology is
relatively costly or imperfect, only a small portion of high type producers are present in in the cer-
tified market in equilibrium, and this may still cause the non-certified market to collapse, which
results in a quite low welfare level. Most of these results are not a result from the direct welfare
cost of certification, but rather from certification’s effect on the market(s).
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on certification (or labeling), or more broadly, quality dis-
closure. There are two streams of the certification literature. The first strand focuses on the role of
strategic certification intermediaries. Some studies aim to investigate how competition between
certifiers affects market outcomes including optimal pricing schemes, the amount of information
transmitted to consumers or quality provision (e.g., Albano and Lizzeri, 2001; Fischer and Lyon,
2014; Hvide, 2009; and Lizzeri, 1999). Some other papers (e.g., Benabou and Laroque, 1992) ex-
plore whether a reputation concern can mitigate the incentive problems of certification interme-
diaries. Some of these papers have something in common with ours in that they show a potential
source of inefficiency associated with certification. However, while they emphasize the role of
strategic certifiers as a source of inefficiency, we are more interested in sellers’ incentives for get-
ting certified and their incidence on markets taking certification environments as given.
The other strand of this literature focuses on a seller’s incentive for quality disclosure. Since
the “unraveling result”3 was presented by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), many subsequent
studies have explored the subject of when and why unraveling fails to hold (e.g., see De and Na-
bar, 1991; Guo and Zhao, 2009; Grubb, 2011; Hotz and Xiao, 2013; Shavell, 1994; and Viscusi,
3The unraveling result refers to the situation in which each seller voluntarily discloses her quality to consumers for
differentiating herself from other sellers with a lower quality if quality disclosure is credible and costless.
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1978). Closely related with such work, several authors also studied whether mandatory disclo-
sure laws enhance or hinder efficiency when voluntary disclosure fails to occur (e.g., see Bar-Isaac
et al., 2012; Board, 2009; Gavazza and Lizzeri, 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2011; Jovanovic, 1982; and
Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985). Though these papers share several features with us, the most
important difference in ours is that we compare the situations with and without certification, rat-
her than comparing a situation in which sellers voluntarily choose to get certified with another
situation in which sellers must get certified to sell.4
There are only a relatively small number of studies that focus on welfare effects of certification.
The authors of these studies point that welfare may decrease with the availability of certification
mostly in the context of Eco-labeling, as we do in this paper. Among these studies, Baltzer (2012),
Bonroy and Constantatos (2008) and Zago and Pick (2004) differ from ours in that the underlying
mechanisms that derive welfare decreasing results in their work are other than exacerbated ad-
verse selection problem by certification. The most closely related papers to this one are Mason and
Sterbenz, 1994 and Mason, 2011. Taking into account sellers’ incentive for opting for certification,
the above two papers show that certification can aggravate adverse selection, and thus certifica-
tion maybe welfare reducing. However, the main drivers of the exacerbated adverse selection
problem in their approaches and our approach are different: unlike they are more focused on the
mimicking incentives of low type sellers, we are more interested when certification causes the
collapse of the non-certified market. More importantly, we assume a downward sloping demand
curve in order to seriously consider allocative efficiency, associated with certification, which is an
important factor when examining welfare effects of certification.5
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the base model. To explain
the value of information, in section 3, we compare two benchmarks: full information and no
information case. We derive a certification equilibrium and conduct a welfare analysis in Section
4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All omitted proofs are in the appendix.
3 The Base Model
We consider markets in which there is asymmetric information between consumers and firms
about the product quality.
4For more examples, see cited papers in Dranove and Jin (2010).
5Creane (1998) examines quality certification in an international trade setting, finding that importing (consuming)
welfare decreases with certification. However, global (total) welfare is increasing.
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3.1 Consumers
In order to introduce certification (which implies a segmentation of the market and hence sorting
of demand according to distinct quality/grades) later in the model, a richer modeling structure
for demand is needed. Following Mussa and Rosen (1978), we adopt the vertical differentiation
model of gradations g with a continuum of consumer types each of whom has a unit demand.
Consumers are of total mass 1 and distributed on [θ, θ¯) according to the strictly increasing cdf,
F(θ) . Then, a type-θ consumer’s net utility, when paying price p, is given by
U (g, p|θ) = θg− p,
while a consumer gets 0 when buying nothing. All consumers are price takers.
3.2 Firms
On the supply side suppose there is a mass (measure) n of firms which are also all price takers. A
firm produces (or serves) either high (g¯) or low (g) quality product (or service). Since we do not
focus on a moral hazard problem but on an adverse selection problem, we assume these quality
levels are exogenously given. A proportion of high grade producers is indexed by γ0 ∈ (0, 1),
and γ0n firms can produce a unit of high quality at cost of c¯. The rest of producers, (1− γ0)n, can
produce a unit of low quality at cost of c. Each seller knows the true quality of her own product,
but consumers do not. In order to make the analysis of the lower grade market simpler when a
segmentation of the market arises (under full information or with certification), let us normalize
g = c = 0.
3.3 Two Benchmarks
In the rest of this section, we study the equilibrium configurations when there is no certification
technology (No Information/No Certification) and when the quality of product is observable to
consumers (Full Information) in turn as two benchmark cases before delving into equilibrium con-
figurations with certification. By comparing welfare under the two benchmarks, we will explain
why certification can potentially be valuable to the society.
3.3.1 No Information (No Certification) Equilibrium
Without any quality certification the market is subject to the law of one price, therefore only overall
market demand for different compositions of quality on offer is required. Consider the supply
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side first. No high quality goods are offered if the price is below their production costs. More
specifically,
qS(p) =

κ(1− γ0)n, κ ∈ [0, 1] if p = 0,
(1− γ0)n if p ∈ (0, c¯),
(1− γ0 + κγ0)n, κ ∈ [0, 1] if p = c¯,
n if p > c¯.
(1)
Since consumers rationally anticipate the supply schedules, the demand structure is given by
qD(p) =
1− F (p/γg¯) if p ≥ c¯,0 if p < c¯,
in which γ is beliefs of consumers, and so γg¯ represents ex-ante average quality in the market. To
make the analysis non-trivial, we take the following assumption.
Assumption 1: 0 < c¯ < γ0 g¯θ¯
Assumption 1 specifies cost structure under which adverse selection need not necessarily hap-
pen. The last inequality implies that at least some trade of high quality given the prior belief is
efficient. The potential for adverse selection comes from the first inequality, which implies that all
high producers are driven out if consumers believe that there are no high type in the market. This
is because in that case even for the highest type the consumer valuation would be lower than c¯.
Since we are interested in inquiring about if certification can decrease social welfare, we further
assume that the number of firms is relatively small so that there is asymmetric information in the
market but not necessarily an adverse selection problem.
Assumption 2: n ≤ 1− F(c¯/γ0 g¯)
Under Assumption 2, in any equilibrium in which a positive quantity is traded (at an equili-
brium price greater than c¯), rational expectation implies that consumer beliefs must be the same
as prior beliefs, i.e., γ = γ0, and all n firms serve consumers.6 As seen in Figure 1, although there
exists a trivial one in which no transaction occurs (pNI = 0 and qNI = 0) as well in general, we
select the equilibrium with the higher quantity and the higher level of welfare.
Thus, in equilibrium
6In principle, γ could differ from γ0 if n is sufficiently large because there may be some high quality producers
staying out of the market in equilibrium when the market price is equal to c¯. See Creane and Jeitschko (2016) for more
on this point.
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Figure 1: No Information Equilibrium
Note: The demand curves need not necessarily be linear.
qNI = n; pNI = γ0 g¯H(1− n)
piNIH = p
NI − c¯; piNIL = pNI
where H(τ) ≡ F−1(τ) a quantile function defined on [0, 1).7
3.3.2 Full Information Equilibrium
Under full information assumption, firms will be sorted into two distinct groups. And thus, we
have to examine the two separate markets. In the low grade market (market L), it is optimal for
low grade producers to produce as long as the market price (pL) is greater than their production
cost c = 0. All low quality firms are indifferent between producing or not when pL = 0. Therefore,
the supply correspondence in market L is given by,
qSL (pL|n) =
κ(1− γ0)n, κ ∈ [0, 1] if pL = 0,(1− γ0)n if pL > 0.
7qNI = n, or θNI = H(1− n).
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Figure 2: Full Information Equilibrium
(a) High Grade Goods Market (b) Low Grade Goods Market
Note: The demand functions need not necessarily be linear.
However, it is optimal for any type of consumer, θ, not to purchase in this market if pL is positive
because U
(
g, pL|θ
)
= −pL < 0 for all consumer types. This implies the demand correspondence
in market L is given by,
qDL (pL|n) =
∈ [0, 1] if pL = 0,0 if pL > 0.
In principle, the equilibrium quantity can vary though the unique equilibrium price is 0 (pL = 0).
In all such situations, we assume there is no transaction by setting qFIL = 0 and p
FI
L = 0. Note that
the normalization assumption in market L (g = c = 0) results in the normalization of surplus in
that market as well. 8
Now consider the high grade market (market H). The supply schedule can be derived in a
8This does not harm generality much for total welfare analysis. However, when it comes to consumer surplus, this
simplifying assumption makes a difference. With the normalization assumption, the surplus of the marginal consumer
in market H is 0. In contrast, if we assume gθ¯ > c, so that if some lower quality products can be served in an equilibrium,
the marginal consumer of the higher grade market should get some surplus since now she has an outside option of
buying from the lower grade market. Therefore, consumer surplus from the high grade market may decrease with the
normalization in market L.
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similar way as we did for market L:
qSH (pH |n) =

0 if pH < c¯,
κγ0n, κ ∈ [0, 1] if pH = c¯,
γ0n if pH > c¯.
In order to derive demand, note that a type-θ consumer would purchase given pH if and only if
U (g¯, pH |θ) = g¯θ − pH ≥ 0.
If we define the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying or not as θFIH ≡ pH/g¯,
consumers with θ ≥ θFIH buy high grade goods, while the remainder (θ < θFIH ) do not. The demand
schedule is thus given by
qDH(pH) =
1− F (pH/g¯) if pH ∈ [0, g¯θ¯],0 if pH > g¯θ¯.
Assumption 2 implies that under full information all high types serve in the market,9 and thus the
equilibrium outcome can be summarized as follows,
qFIH = γ0n; q
FI
L = 0;
pFIH = g¯H(1− γ0n) > c¯; pFIL = 0;
piFIH = p
FI
H − c¯; piFIL = 0,
where piFIH and pi
FI
L stand for equilibrium profits of high and low quality firms under full informa-
tion respectively.10
3.3.3 Welfare Comparison
Having the equilibrium configurations in the two benchmarks, we show that information increa-
ses social welfare. We take social welfare as the sum of firm profits and consumer surplus. Since
price paid by consumers is just transferred to firms, total welfare under no information and full
9Mathematically, this is because Assumption 2 implies n < 1− F(c¯/γ0 g¯) < (1/γ0) [1− F(c¯/g¯)] and thus, n ≤
(1/γ0) [1− F(c¯/g¯)]⇐⇒ pFIH = g¯H(1− γ0n) ≥ c¯.
10qFIH = γ0n, or θ
FI = H(1− γ0n).
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information can be written as gross consumer benefits net of production costs:
WNI =
∫ θ¯
θNI
γ0 g¯θdF(θ)− γ0nc¯,
WFI =
∫ θ¯
θFIH
g¯θdF(θ)− γ0nc¯.
Proposition 1 (Information Increases Welfare) Welfare is strictly greater under full information than under
no information regardless of a proportion of high grade producers, i.e.,
WFI > WNI , ∀γ0 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Subtracting WNI from WFI and rewriting it shows a trade-off between the two situations as
follows:
WFI −WNI =
∫ θ¯
θFIH
g¯θdF(θ)−
∫ θ¯
θNI
γ0 g¯θdF(θ)
=
{∫ θ¯
θFIH
g¯θdF(θ)−
∫ θ¯
θFIH
γ0 g¯θdF(θ)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gains from reallocating
high quality to θ ≥ θFIH
−
∫ θFIH
θNI
γ0 g¯θdF(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Losses from not served
consumers (θNI < θ < θFIH )
.
Now we show that the above expression is always greater than 0. Note that
∫ θ2
θ1
θdF(θ) = θ2F(θ2)−
θ1F(θ1)−
∫ θ2
θ1
F(θ)dθ =
∫ τ2
τ1
H(τ)dτ for any arbitrary θ1 < θ2 and corresponding τ1 < τ2. The first
equality follows from integration by parts and the second from the definition of H(·). This implies,
WFI −WNI = g¯
[
(1− γ0)
∫ 1
τFIH
H(θ)dθ − γ0
∫ τFIH
τNI
H(θ)dθ
]
,
where θFIH = H(τ
FI
H ) and θ
NI = H(τNI). Moreover, since (τ2 − τ1)H(τ1) <
∫ τ2
τ1
H(τ)dτ < (τ2 −
τ1)H(τ2) for any increasing H(·)11, we have
WFI −WNI > g¯
[
(1− γ0)(1− τFIH )θFIH − γ0(τFIH − τNI)θFIH
]
= g¯
[
(1− γ0)γ0nθFIH − γ0(1− γ0)nθFIH
]
= 0.
11Since F(·) is strictly increasing, so is H(·).
9
Figure 3: Welfare Comparison between NI and FI Benchmarks
Note: The demand function needs not necessarily be linear.

Proposition 1 states that restoring full information improves welfare. The intuition behind this
result is straightforward. Even though the market is not subject to adverse selection under no
information, the market still suffers from an allocation inefficiency associated with asymmetric
information. This is because those with relatively higher valuations may obtain a low quality pro-
duct and vice versa. When we move from the no information case to the full information case,
while the aggregate production costs remain the same, allocative efficiency is restored because
now high quality goods are allocated only to the group of consumers with relatively higher valua-
tions. To understand this point further, refer to Figure 3. The measure of γ0n consumers above θFIH
gain at least g¯(1− γ0)θFIH each from the reallocation of goods, while the measure of (1− γ0)n con-
sumers between θNI and θFIH lose at most γ0 g¯θ
FI
H . Hence, welfare under full information is always
greater.
4 Certification Equilibrium
The previous section shows that information increases social welfare. One immediate implication
of the result is that perfect and cost-less certification, which coincides with the full information
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benchmark, is welfare enhancing. However, what if the certification technology is costly or im-
perfect? Are there any cases in which welfare with certification is even lower than that under no
information? In order to answer these questions, we derive a price equilibrium given certification
decisions of firms and then characterize a certification equilibrium. The welfare analysis follows
next and shows that certification may actually decrease social welfare.
For simplicity and tractability of the model, we employ further assumptions. Throughout this
section, let us assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the line segment [0, 1], i.e.,
F(θ) = θ
on [0, 1], and H(τ) = τ. Also, for simplicity we normalize g¯ = 1. To reduce the equilibrium
constellations to consider, we also restrict our interests to the case in which Assumption 2 binds
and denote such measure of producers by n¯. With the uniform distribution assumption, note that
n¯ = 1− c¯/γ0.
4.1 Certification Environment
We consider a certification market in which all certifiers are homogeneous in their certification
costs and accuracy of certification test. More specifically, each certifier needs to incur the same
fixed cost of certification, z ≥ 0. We further assume that the certification market is perfectly
competitive so that the equilibrium price for certification is always equal to z.
Certification technology may be imperfect in the following sense. Let g˜ denote the grade dis-
covered by the certification test. Then,
Pr {g˜ = g¯|g = g¯} = x; Pr
{
g˜ = g¯|g = g
}
= 0;
Pr
{
g˜ = g|g = g¯
}
= 1− x; Pr
{
g˜ = g|g = g
}
= 1,
where 0 < x ≤ 1. So, the test is informative in the sense that the test perfectly weeds low grades
out and identifies a high type with some precision. Put differently, the certification test commits
a type-I error with probability 1− x but not a type-II error. However, x can be lower than 1/2.
Certification is imperfect unless x = 1.
If the test reveals that a seller is of high type (g˜ = g¯), she gets certified (Crt). Otherwise (g˜ = 0),
the seller can only sell in the pool of sellers who did not apply for certification and applied but
failed to get certification (NC). Put differently, consumers can only condition on whether the good
is certified or not certified. Finally, the sellers cannot shop around for certification, and so the
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first certification result sticks. This assumption precludes the possibility that the sellers use an
imperfect and cost-less certification repeatedly in such a way that full information outcome may
be replicated.
We consider the following two-period model when certification is an available option for sel-
lers:
Period 1 (Certification Decision): In the first period each seller makes a decision whether to opt
for certification test or not.
Period 2 (Walrasian Price Formation): In the second period, with there being asymmetric infor-
mation partially resolved through the certification (given sellers’ certification decisions and out-
comes) process, trade takes place in which Walrasian mechanism forms prices in both markets:
certified (pCrt) and non-certified (pNC) market. Depending on offered prices in each market, high
and low grade producers decide whether to produce at production costs of c¯ and 0 respectively
(produce to demand) or to shut down, and consumers choose to buy in the Crt market or in the
NC market or not to buy.
In fact, firms need to go through a certification process before producing in many cases. For
example, to get the USDA Organic label, a farm must develop and implement an organic system
plan first and then hire a USDA-accredited certifying agent to get inspected before producing.
Note that in this case the certification cost, z, can include all expenses for adopting the organic
system as well as an agency fee.12
4.2 Price Equilibrium
Given the assumptions on certification environment, there is no chance that the low type is iden-
tified as the high type by the test. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that the low
type never seeks certification, and the price equilibrium constellations depend only on the high
producers’ certification decisions. Let α denote the proportion of high type sellers who choose
to opt for certification. Then, there are three cases to consider: a pooling equilibrium (α = 0), a
semi-separating equilibrium (α ∈ (0, 1)) and a fully separating equilibrium (α = 1). In a pooling
equilibrium in which no high type seeks certification (α = 0), the resulting outcomes coincide with
the no information benchmarks, and there is nothing to be analyzed further. In a semi-separating
equilibrium or a fully separating one, certification environment gives rise to the following two
interesting features. First, third party certification results in market segmentation. Second, if a
large portion of high grade firms congregate in one of the two markets, this may give rise to the
12See https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/organic-certification/becoming-certified (last retrieved on May 1,
2017).
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collapse of the other market due to the intensified adverse selection even if there is no adverse
selection problem in the beginning when all firms are pooled together in one market.
In order to derive a price equilibrium for each α ∈ (0, 1], write down the supply schedules in
each market which are similar to (1) with the modification of population of high and low grade
producers. In the Crt market there are αxγ0n¯ measure of high producers deciding whether to
produce or not. Similarly, in the NC market, the rest of producers, the pool of (1− αx)γ0n¯ measure
of high types and (1− γ0)n¯ of low types, make the same decisions. And thus, supply schedules
in the two markets are given by
qCrt/S(pCrt) =

0 if pCrt ∈ [0, c¯),
ραxγ0n¯, ρ ∈ [0, 1] if pCrt = c¯,
αxγ0n¯ if pCrt > c¯;
(2)
qNC/S(pNC) =

κ(1− γ0)n¯, κ ∈ [0, 1] if pNC = 0,
(1− γ0)n¯ if pNC ∈ (0, c¯),
[(1− γ0) + κ (1− αx) γ0] n¯, κ ∈ [0, 1] if pNC = c¯,
[(1− γ0) + (1− αx) γ0] n¯ if pNC > c¯.
(3)
Since consumers rationally expect the supply schedules, the posterior belief for the Crt market is
given by
γCrt ≡ γ (g¯|Crt) = αxργ0
αxργ0
= 1
as long as pCrt ≥ c¯ and γ (1|Crt) = 0 otherwise. Note that in the NC market low grade producers
are willing to sell at all positive prices while high types would only do so when pNC ≥ c¯, which
implies in any equilibrium associated with some transaction and with shutting down by some
firms, the exiting firms must be of high type. From this argument we know that,
γNC ≡ γ (g¯|NC) = (1− αx) κγ0
(1− αx) κγ0 + (1− γ0) ≤
(1− αx) γ0
(1− αx) γ0 + (1− γ0)
in which κ is 1 for pNC > c¯, any number in [0, 1] for pNC = c¯ and 0 for pNC < c¯. Thus, γCrt = 1 >
γ0 ≥ γNC for all α ∈ (0, 1], which basically means that certification allows high quality producers
to differentiate themselves from low quality producers with some probability while lowering the
average quality in the NC market .
Given these beliefs and two price levels - pCrt and pNC, consumers are divided into three sepa-
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rate groups depending on the following decision rule: a type-θ consumerbuys in market i ifγ
iθ − pi ≥ max{γjθ − pj, 0},
does not buy if 0 ≥ max{γCrtθ − pCrt,γNCθ − pNC},
(4)
where i, j ∈ {Crt, NC} and i 6= j.
After defining a price equilibrium formally, we will derive some preliminary results.
Definition 1 A price equilibrium in the second period, given high types’ certification decision (α) and
certification precision (x), is a quadruple of (pCrt,γCrt, pNC,γNC) such that
1. Walrasian Market Clearing in Both Markets: given pCrt and pNC, the quantities supplied, determined
by (2) and (3), equal to the quantities demanded, derived by (4) and beliefs: γCrt and γNC, in each
market.
2. Consistent Beliefs: there exists ρ (and κ) ∈ [0, 1] describing high grade firms’ production decisions
in (2) (and (3)) which implies equilibrium quantity in the certified market (and non-certified market)
and γCrt (and γNC).
Note that there could be two potential types of price equilibria: with only one active market
and the collapse of the other, and with two active markets. Let’s denote the former one as “1-
market” equilibrium and the latter as “2-market.” To verify the equilibrium characteristics and its
uniqueness, first we derive some conditions that equilibrium prices should meet.
Lemma 1 In any price equilibrium in which some high quality goods are traded,
1. the equilibrium price in the Crt market is always greater than that in the NC market (i.e., pCrt >
pNC);
2. if some high quality producers shut down, the equilibrium price for that market must be equal to c¯.
There are several important implications of Lemma 1. First, since pCrt is higher than pNC in
equilibrium (and γCrt > γNC), there is no 1-market equilibrium in which transaction occurs only
in the NC market. This implies that 1-market and 2-market equilibria have to result in the price
structures pCrt ≥ c¯ > pNC = 0 and pCrt > pNC ≥ c¯ respectively.
Second, there exists a marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying in Crt market and
NC market. The cutoff consumer’s type θCrt is derived from the following condition:
γCrtθCrt − pCrt = γNCθCrt − pNC. (5)
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Without considering the possibility of not buying, all consumers with θ ≥ θCrt are affiliated with
the Crt market while the remainder belongs to the NC market.
Third, all high types with a certification should serve (ρ = 1) in both 1-market and 2-market
equilibria. To see this, recall that the equilibrium price under no information with n¯ is equal to
c¯ implying the margin is 0 for the high grade producers. Now, there are only αxγ0n¯ number of
producers in the Crt market, and they serve consumers with relatively high valuations from the
top (i.e., θ ∈ [θCrt, 1]). Also, note that each consumer’s willingness to pay is also higher than that
under no information because γCrt > γ0. Therefore, it must be the case, pCrt > c¯ and ρ = 1.
Fourth, in any 2-market equilibria, pNC = c¯ and κ < 1. In no information benchmark, θNI-type
consumer’s willingness to pay, γ0θNI , was equal to c¯. Now since γNC < γ0, his willingness to pay
is lower than c¯, and so some high types have to shut down. It is optimal that some high types
choose to sell and the others do not only when those two actions yield the same payoffs of 0 to
them, which implies pNC = c¯.
If both type of equilibria coexist, even though the previous claim implies that given α, x and
n¯, social welfare from the Crt market is invariant with the equilibrium quantity equal to αxγ0n¯,
we may have multiple price equilibria due to the nature of the NC market. Hence, equilibrium
selection is necessary to make a prediction about optimal certification decisions. To be consistent
with the no information benchmark and as we want to show welfare under certification might be
lower than under no information, we select the most favorable equilibrium in terms of welfare.
Note that if there exist both 1-market and 2-market equilibrium, the welfare maximizing one is the
2-market equilibrium. Otherwise, the welfare maximizing equilibrium is the 1-market one. The
lemma below characterizes such price equilibria.
Lemma 2 The price equilibrium constellations are as follows.
1. If the production cost of high quality good is relatively high (i.e., c¯ ∈ [γ2o ,γ0)), the NC market always
collapses (κ = 0), so a 1-market equilibrium is the unique welfare maximizing price equilibrium for
all α ∈ (0, 1] and x ∈ (0, 1]; and
2. if the production cost of high quality good is relatively low (i.e., c¯ ∈ (0,γ2o)), there exists a threshold
ξ such that
(a) for αx ∈ (ξ, 1], the NC market always collapses, so a 1-market equilibrium is the unique welfare
maximizing price equilibrium; and
(b) for αx ∈ (0, ξ], a 2-market equilibrium with κ(α, x) ∈ (0, 1) is the unique welfare maximizing
price equilibrium where κ(α, x) is the larger root solving pNC = c¯.
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The lemma states conditions under which we have 1-market and 2-market equilibria. In order
to grasp a deeper understanding, first we explain two different negative effects of high type’s
departure, from the pool of entire producers to the Crt market, on equilibrium price in the NC
market. Not only it causes the average quality in the NC market (γNC) to fall (rotation in the NC
market demand curve), but also it skims consumers with highest valuations from the pool (left
shift of the NC market demand curve). However, that does not necessarily result in the collapse
of the NC market if some portion of high type shut down. With a downward sloping demand
curve, this exit by high grade producers has two countervailing effects on equilibrium price down
in the NC market: pNC might increase due to the decrease in quantity supplied (move along the
NC market demand curve) but decrease due to the further drop in the average quality in the
NC market (further rotation in the NC market demand curve). If the former effect dominates
the latter, 2-market equilibria may emerge. Therefore, as stated in Lemma 2 price equilibrium
configurations crucially depend on the magnitude of c¯. 2-market equilibria do not emerge at all
when c¯ is relatively large (or n¯ relatively small) because, roughly speaking, the smaller n¯, the less
potential for such positive (quantity) effects on pNC.
Given any certification decisions (characterized by α), the corresponding welfare-maximizing
price equilibrium is unique and well defined. Corollary 1 formally summarizes price equilibrium
outcomes.
Corollary 1 The welfare maximizing price equilibrium outcomes are as follows (given α and x).
1. When only 1-market equilibria exist,
γCrt = 1; γNC = 0;
θCrt = 1− αxγ0n¯; θNC = θCrt;
pCrt = θCrt; pNC = 0;
piCrtH = p
Crt − c¯; piNCH = piNCL = 0.
2. When 1-market and 2-market equilibria coexist,
γCrt = 1; γNC = γNC (κ(α, x)) ;
θCrt = 1− αxγ0n¯; θNC = 1− [1− (1− αx) {1− κ(α, x)}] n¯;
pCrt = (1− γNC)θCrt − pNC; pNC = γNCθNC = c¯;
piCrtH = p
Crt − c¯; piNCH = 0;
piNCL = p
NC;
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where κ(α, x) is defined as in Lemma 2, and θCrt and θNC represent the marginal consumer in the
Crt and NC market respectively.
4.3 Certification Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis
Assuming all aspects and results of the model up to now are common knowledge to the agents,
now we explore optimal decisions of high types on certification and conduct welfare analysis.
As stated earlier, we are interested in checking whether availability of certification is socially be-
neficial or not. In order to highlight the welfare decreasing result without involving 2-market
equilibria, first we consider the case 1 in Lemma 2 where the collapse of the NC market arises
whenever some high types get certification. Next, we confirm that similar results also hold for the
other cases in which 2-market equilibria may emerge.
4.3.1 Analysis when only 1-market Equilibria Exist
Throughout this subsection, assume that c¯ ∈ [γ20,γ0) is relatively large so that even an arbitrarily
small exit of high quality triggers the collapse of the NC market. In period 1, each high type
will decide whether to get certified or not given a pair of a certification cost and a test precision,
(z, x) ∈ Ω ≡ R+ × (0, 1]. From the two benchmark cases and Corollary 1, given all other agents’
strategies (given α), an individual high type’s payoff of opting for certification is given by
EΠH(Cert|α) = x {(1− αxγ0n¯)− c¯} − z
because she gets piCrtH only with probability x and 0 with the complementary probability, but pays
z regardless of the certification outcome. In contrast, the payoff of not getting certified is always
given by EΠH(No Cert|α) = 0 regardless of α because in either case she ends up getting piNCH = 0.
The optimal decision rule for a high type is derived by comparing the payoffs with and without
certification. However, since in our model each agent is atomic, technically it is hard for us to
imagine how each individual’s deviation affects the equilibrium prices. To this end, we define the
certification equilibrium as follows which is particularly useful for the analysis associated with
2-market equilibria:
Definition 2 Given (z, x), α∗ characterizes a certification equilibrium if there is no profitable e-deviation
among the high grade producers. A profitable e-deviation means that there exists an arbitrarily small
positive number e ≈ 0 such that EΠH(Cert|α∗) > EΠH(No Cert|α∗ − e) and EΠH(No Cert|α∗) >
EΠH(Cert|α∗ + e).
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Since here EΠH(Cert|α) and EΠH(No Cert|α) are monotone and constant with respect to α re-
spectively, we have three different certification equilibrium configurations depending on the costs
of certification fixing the certification precision. Given x, when the certification cost is relatively
small, a fully separating equilibrium arises (α∗ = 1). When the certification cost is relatively high, a
pooling equilibrium arises (α∗ = 0). When the certification cost is intermediate, a semi-separating
equilibrium arises with α∗ ∈ (0, 1) in which all high quality producers are indifferent between
getting certified or not, i.e., EΠH(Cert|α∗) = EΠH(No Cert|α∗). The preceding arguments are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose only 1-market equilibria exist (i.e., c¯ ∈ [γ20,γ0)). Then, given x ∈ (0, 1], in
equilibrium all high types apply for certification (α∗ = 1) when z is relatively small, only some of them (
α∗ ∈ (0, 1)) when z is intermediate and no high types (α∗ = 0) when z is relatively large. Specifically,
α∗ =

1 if z ∈ [0, z˜(x)] ,
1
xγ0n¯
[
1− ( zx + c¯)] if z ∈ (z˜(x), zˆ(x)) ,
0 if z ∈ [zˆ(x),∞) ,
where z˜(x) ≡ x {(1− xγ0n¯)− c¯} and zˆ(x) ≡ x (1− c¯).
As each (z, x) ∈ Ω has a unique certification equilibrium, we can define three mutually exclu-
sive subsets of Ω in which fully separating, semi-separating, and pooling equilibria arise respecti-
vely:
ΩFS ≡ {(z, x) ∈ Ω|z ≤ z˜(x) and x ∈ (0, 1]} ,
ΩSS ≡ {(z, x) ∈ Ω|z˜(x) < z < zˆ(x) and x ∈ (0, 1]} ,
ΩP ≡ {(z, x) ∈ Ω|zˆ(x) ≤ z and x ∈ (0, 1]} .
Figure 4 illustrates the three subsets ofΩ on the z− x plane. A simple comparative statics analysis
suggests that more high quality producers seek certification, ceteris paribus, as z decreases on
parameter spaces in which a semi-separating equilibrium emerges (i.e., ∀(z, x) ∈ ΩSS).
For (z, x) in ΩFS or ΩSS , the welfare function defined as the sum of consumer surplus and
firms’ expected profits net of certification costs can be written as
WCrt (z, x) =
∫ 1
θCrt
θdθ − α∗xγ0n¯c¯− α∗γ0n¯z
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Figure 4: Certification Equilibrium Constellations
Note: Vertical and horizontal axes represent accuracy of the certification technology and the certi-
fication cost respectively.
where θCrt = 1− α∗xγ0n¯ and α∗ as defined in Proposition 2. Otherwise, i.e., (z, x) ∈ ΩP, WCrt(z, x) =
WNI . Depending on the parameter values, we have three qualitatively different results. If certi-
fication environments are similar enough to the full information benchmark (put differently, if z
is low, and x is high), then welfare with certification is greater than welfare under no information
(WCrt(z, x) > WNI). In this situation, certification is profitable for all high type producers. Even
though certification causes the NC market collapse and accrues certification costs, allocative effi-
ciency enhanced by certification outweighs such loss. In the opposite extreme cases, if the cost of
certification is too large or the certification technology is too inaccurate, nobody has an incentive to
opt for certification. Thus, welfare with certification coincides with welfare under no information
(WCrt(z, x) = WNI).
The most interesting case is the intermediate area in between the above two extremes in which
welfare with certification is lower than welfare under no information (WCrt(z, x) < WNI). In order
to formally state these results, let us define ΩNI ≡ {(z, x) ∈ ΩFS|WCrt(z, x) = WNI} and upper
contour set of welfare level WNI as ΩNI+ ≡ {(z, x) ∈ ΩFS|WCrt(z, x) > WNI}.
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Figure 5: Welfare Comparisons
Note: Vertical and horizontal axes represent accuracy of the certification technology and the cer-
tification cost respectively. z∗|x=1 represents a value such that WCrt(z∗, 1) = WNI . In a similar
fashion, x∗|z=0 represent a value such that WCrt(0, x∗) = WNI .
Proposition 3 Suppose only 1-market equilibria exist (i.e., c¯ ∈ [γ20,γ0)). Then,
WCrt(z, x)

> WNI if (z, x) ∈ ΩNI+,
= WNI if (z, x) ∈ ΩNI ∪ΩP,
< WNI otherwise,
where ΩNI+is a convex proper subset of ΩFS which is located around the point (0, 1) as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows a graphical illustration of Proposition 3. It is worth noting that it is not per
se certification cost which makes WCrt lower than WNI . As we discussed in the full information
benchmark, certification brings welfare gain from reallocating high quality to consumers whose
value for the good is relatively high. However, if only a small measure of high grade producers
are selected into the Crt market, such welfare gain with certification will be negligible. Moreover,
given that we consider a parameter space on which the NC market always collapses with certifi-
cation, welfare loss will be huge because most of high type producers now shut down. In other
words, the main driving force for a welfare-decreasing result is adverse selection caused by a ne-
gative impact of certification on the NC market. To see this point clearly, consider the vertical axis
in Figure 5. If the certification technology is relatively inaccurate (x < x∗|z=0), we see WCrt < WNI
even though the certification cost is 0.
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4.3.2 Analysis when 1-market and 2-market Equilibria Coexist
We now turn our attention to the other case c¯ ∈ (0,γ20) so that 2-market equilibria may exist. For
simplicity, we investigate only the following two special cases in turn: “a cost-less (z = 0), but
imperfect (x ∈ (0, 1]) test” and “a costly (z ∈ [0,∞)), but perfect (x = 1) one”.
Cost-less (z = 0), but Imperfect (x ∈ (0, 1]) Test
In this case, from Corollary 1 one can easily see that piCrtH > 0 and pi
NC
H = 0 for all α > 0
(i.e., regardless of whether there exists a 2-market equilibrium or not). Then, since certification is
free here, expected payoffs of high types are always higher with certification, i.e., EΠH(Cert|α) =
xpiCrtH > EΠH(No Cert|α) = 0 for all α > 0, which implies the unique certification equilibrium is
a fully separating one (α∗ = 1).
What remains unknown for welfare calculation is to check when we would have a 2-market
equilibria. From Lemma 2, 2-market equilibria are expected for only small x values. Let κ− and
κ+ the smaller and larger solutions solving for
pNC(κ|α∗ = 1, x · · · ) = c¯
respectively. Then, if real roots of the above equation exist, then according to our equilibrium
selection criteria, we choose κ(α∗ = 1, x) = κ+. Hence, welfare in this case is given by
WCrt (x) =
∫ 1
θCrt
θdθ − xγ0n¯c¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare from Crt market
+
∫ θCrt
θNC
γNCθdθ − (1− x)(1− κ+)γ0n¯c¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare from NC market
,
where all corresponding variables are defined as in Lemma 2-2 with κ(α∗ = 1, x) = κ+. If we have
just 1-market equilibria, welfare is given by
WCrt (x) =
∫ 1
θCrt
θdθ − xγ0n¯c¯,
where all corresponding variables are defined as in Lemma 2-1.
We demonstrate welfare comparisons of a 2-market equilibrium through simulations when
γ0 = .5 for various values of production cost c¯ in Figure 6. In all 3 panels except c¯ = .25(= γ20), we
have cutoffs of test precision determining before which 2-market equilibria emerge and otherwise
1-market equilibria. Put differently, if test is more precise than the cutoffs, certification results in
the collapse of the NC market in equilibrium. The simulation shows that WCrt could be lower than
WNI here too as long as production costs are not too small.
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Figure 6: Welfare Comparisons under Cost-less, but Imperfect Certification when γ0 = .5
(a) c¯ = .02 (b) c¯ = .05
(c) c¯ = .15 (d) c¯ = .25
Note: Vertical and horizontal axes represent welfare levels and the certification accuracy respecti-
vely.
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Costly (z ∈ [0,∞)), but Perfect (x = 1) Test
Now we study the case of costly but perfect certification. More specifically, consider the case
where γ0 = .5 and c¯ = .1. Then, depending on certification decisions, whole trajectories of equi-
librium prices and profit levels of high grade producers are as shown in Figure 7. As seen in the
case of cost-less and imperfect certification, 2-market equilibria prevail if only small number of
high types choose to get certified (relatively small α). This causes discontinuities in the price and
profit functions.
Given the price equilibrium outcomes, optimal certification decisions depend on the sizes of
EΠH(Cert|α) = piCrtH − z and EΠH(No Cert|α) = 0. Note that if the certification cost is relati-
vely small (z ≤ z˜), a fully separating equilibrium is obtained (refer to the right panel of Figure
7). Similarly, if the certification cost is relatively large (z ≥ zˆ), a pooling equilibrium results. Ot-
herwise (z˜ < z < zˆ), a certification equilibrium candidate must satisfy the following condition:
piCrtH (α
∗) = z. Note that for values of z slightly above z˜, there might be two equilibrium candidates
(α) making high types indifferent between opting for certification and not doing so. However, the
certification equilibrium associated with the smaller candidate of the two is not e-stable because
high types currently not opting for certification expect the equilibrium price and their profits to in-
crease if a small measure of them deviate. Therefore, the certification equilibrium is characterized
by α∗ such that piCrtH (α
∗) = z and ∂piCrtH /∂α|α=α∗ < 0.
One thing to note is that here the highest certification cost supporting a semi-separating equili-
brium, zˆ, is lower than the one we would have obtained if we did not consider 2-market equilibria
(which would have been given as zˆ = 1− c¯ = .9 as in Proposition 2). Whenever 2-market equi-
librium exist, the price in Crt market should be set in such a way leaving the exact same amount
of surplus to the marginal type consumer (θCrt) which he would get when purchasing in the NC
market instead. For this reason, when 2-market equilibria exist, the upper bound supporting a
semi-separating certification equilibrium gets smaller.
Welfare calculations again depend on the type of equilibrium. If we have 2-market equilibria,
WCrt (z) =
∫ 1
θCrt
θdθ − α∗γ0n¯c¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare from Crt market
+
∫ θCrt
θNC
γNCθdθ − (1− α∗)(1− κ+)γ0n¯c¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare from NC market
− α∗γ0n¯z︸ ︷︷ ︸
Certification Costs
,
where all corresponding variables are defined as in Lemma 2-2 with κ(α∗, x = 1) = κ+ and
Proposition 2. If we have just 1-market equilibria,
WCrt (z) =
∫ 1
θCrt
θdθ − α∗γ0n¯(c¯ + z),
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Figure 7: Price Equilibrium Outcomes under Costly, but Perfect Certification when γ0 = .5 and
c¯ = .1
(a) Equilibrium Prices in Crt and NC Markets (b) Equilibrium Profits of High Types
Note: Vertical and horizontal axes represent price and profit levels and measure of high grade
producers opting for certification respectively.
where all corresponding variables are defined as in Lemma 2-1 and Proposition 2. Figure 8 sum-
marizes simulation results regarding welfare levels for various values of production cost. It con-
firms once again that welfare could be lower with certification. In all cases, as the certification cost,
z, increases from 0 to a certain threshold, welfare with certification monotonically decreases from
the full information level to the one lower than the no information level. Beyond the threshold, it
becomes the same as the no information level.
5 Conclusion
It is well-known that markets with asymmetric information about quality or other vertically diffe-
rentiating goods characteristics suffer from allocative inefficiencies. Overcoming these asymme-
tries can lead to welfare increases. However, this understanding overlooks the close relationships
between markets. Allowing for certification may create the co-existence of both a certified and
a non-certified market. Both consumers and firms subsequently self-select into one market, the
other market, or opting out. Total welfare is a function of these self-selections, and thus welfare
implications cannot be considered in isolation. If certification is imperfect or costly, then positive
externalities of high quality in non-certified markets can be destroyed without a complete offset-
ting through added welfare in the certified markets. This implies subtle policy-implications when
evaluating the introduction of government certification programs and regulations of industry self-
governance with respect to certification programs.
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Figure 8: Welfare Comparisons under Costly, but Perfect Certification when γ0 = .5
(a) c¯ = .05 (b) c¯ = .10
(c) c¯ = .20 (d) c¯ = .25
Note: Vertical and horizontal axes represent welfare levels and certification costs respectively.
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We close this paper by discussing one feasible extension that may offer additional interesting
insights. It would be interesting to add a first stage to the game in which firms make their entry
decisions. This will allow us to see long-run consequences of certification depending on different
certification environments, which have received little interest in most of existing studies. We leave
this idea for future research to consider.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of proposition 1 is in the text of the paper. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Let us show pCrt > pNC first. Suppose there exist a price equilibrium where at least some high
quality goods are traded and pCrt ≤ pNC. Then, since γCrt ≥ γNC,
γCrtθ − pCrt > γNCθ − pNC ∀θ ∈ [0, 1].
Then, all consumers θ ≥ PCrt/γCrt wants to buy in Crt. Having some equilibrium output of
high quality goods, it must be the case that the cutoff type should be in the interior of support
of consumer types i.e., PCrt/γCrt ∈(0, θ¯). Otherwise, there is no demand for both markets, and
such an equilibrium does not exist. Thus, it is sufficient to only consider the following range of
pCrt ∈ (0,γCrt): If 0 < pCrt < c¯, there is no supply in Crt market even though there is demand,
so such prices are not market clearing. If c¯ ≤ pCrt < γCrt, there are always some low quality
producers willing to sell in NC since pNC ≥ pCrt ≥ c¯ > 0 while there is no demand at all for that
market. Hence, these prices are not market clearing either, which implies pCrt > pNC must be true.
The second argument is obvious from the binary feature of firm’s optimal decision rule. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Given n¯ (or c¯) and α ∈ (0, 1), for a 2-market equilibrium to exist, the following conditions must
hold:
1. Existence of marginal types (θCrt) between buying in Crt market and buying in NC market:
γCrtθCrt − pCrt = γNCθCrt − pNC;
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2. Existence of marginal types (θNC) between buying in NC market and not buying:
γNCθNC − pNC = 0;
3. Market clearing condition in Crt market
qCrt/D ≡ 1− θCrt = αγ0n¯ ≡ qCrt/S;
4. Market clearing condition in NC market
qNC/D ≡ θCrt − θNC = [(1− αx) κγ0 + (1− γ0)] n¯ ≡ qNC/S;
5. Consistent beliefs: γCrt = 1, γNC = (1−αx)κγ0
(1−αx)κγ0+(1−γ0) ≤
(1−αx)γ0
(1−αx)γ0+(1−γ0) where κ ∈ [0, 1].
6. From high grade firm’s indifferent condition between selling in NC and being inactive and
the definition of n¯, for all κ ∈ [0, 1]
pNC = c¯.
From the condition 3, θCrt = 1− αγ0n¯. Plugging this in the condition 4, we end up having θNC =
{1− [1− (1− αx)(1− κ)γ0] n¯}. Since pCrt can be adjusted according to the condition 1 once pNC
is determined, the existence of a 2-market equilibrium pins down to find a proper κ satisfying
pNC = c¯. More specifically, from the condition 2, 5 and 6, if there exists κ ∈ [0, 1] which solves the
following equation,
pNC(κ|α, x · · · ) ≡ (1− αx) γ0κ
(1− αx) γ0κ + (1− γ0) {1− [1− (1− αx)(1− κ)γ0] n¯} = c¯,
a 2-market equilibrium exists. Before solving the equation, let us show that welfare is maximized
with the largest value κ(α, x · · · ) satisfying the above equation. First, note that welfare generated
from the Crt market will be the same no matter what kind of equilibrium we have because qCrt
and γCrt are invariant. What only changes in the Crt market is pCrt which is a net transfer from
consumers to producers over different kinds of equilibria. Therefore, whenever a 2-market equili-
brium exists, a 1-market equilibrium is not a welfare maximizing one. Then, it remains to pick up
a 2-market equilibrium resulting in the highest welfare level, which is obviously the largest value
κ(α, x · · · ) such that pNC = c¯.
The first and second derivative of pNC(κ|α, x · · · ) with respect to κ are respectively,
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Figure 9: Certification Equilibrium Constellations
Note: We assume that γ0 = .5, c¯ = .1 and x = 1. Vertical and horizontal axes represent pNC and κ
respectively.
∂pNC
∂κ
=
 γ0(1− xα)×
[
1− γ0 −
{
γ20(1− xα)2κ2
+2γ0(1− γ0)(1− xα)κ + (1− γ0) (1− γ0(1− xα))} n¯]

[1− γ0 + γ0(1− xα)κ]2
∂2 pNC
∂κ2
= −2γ
2
0(1− γ0)(1− γ0xαn¯)(1− xα)2
[1− γ0 + γ0(1− xα)κ]3
< 0.
Note that pNC(κ|α, · · · ) has a similar shape with a concave quadratic curve passing through the
origin around which the slope of the curve is positive. Furthermore, as α increases from 0 to 1, this
curve gets closer to the horizontal axis fixing κ and has a (weakly) larger argmax of the function
(i.e., ∂pNC/∂α < 0 given κ for all κ ∈ [0, 1] and ∂(arg maxκ pNC)/∂α ≥ 0). Even though, Figure 9
is drawn for the case where γ0 = .5, c¯ = .1 (so n¯ = .8) and x = 1, the shape of pNC is similar for all
other parameter values. Also, we will have the same properties when it comes to x rather than α
because pNC(κ|α, x · · · ) is symmetric with respect to α and x.
Note that pNC(κ = 1, α = 0) = c¯ always by construction. So, if
∂pNC
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
α=0,κ=1
≥ 0,
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2-market equilibria do not exist. Now observe that
sign
(
∂pNC
∂κ
∣∣∣∣
α=0,κ=1
)
= sign
([
1− γ0 −
{
γ20 + 2γ0(1− γ0) + (1− γ0)2
}
n¯
])
= sign (1− γ0 − n¯) .
Therefore, ∂p
NC
∂κ
∣∣∣
α=0,κ=1
≥ 0⇐⇒ 1− γ0 − n¯ ≥ 0 which is equivalent to c¯ ≥ γ20.
Even though we may have some 2-market equilibria if c¯ < γ20, that is the case only for small
α. Finally, whenever a 2-market equilibria exists, the welfare maximizing κ(α) is the larger root
of the equation pNC(κ|α, · · · ) = c¯. Now it completes the proof to define ξ as a positive number
making pNC(κ|αx = ξ, · · · ) = c¯ have only one solution. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Obvious from the discussion in the text and thus omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 3
We will walk through a sequence of steps leading to the desired results.
Step 1: WCrt (z, x) is strictly decreasing in z and strictly increasing in x onΩFS since ∂WCrt (z, x) /∂z =
−xγ0n¯ < 0 and
∂WCrt (z, x) /∂x = (1− xγ0n¯)γ0n¯− γ0n¯c¯
= {(1− xγ0)− c¯(1− x)} γ0n¯
> (1− c¯) (1− x) γ0n¯
> 0
where the first inequality follows from γ0 < 1, and the second inequality follows from Assump-
tion 1.
Step 2: If x is too small, WCrt (z, x) < WNI regardless of z on ΩFS. To see this, fix z = 0.
Since WCrt(0, 1) = WFI > limx→0 WCrt(0, x) = 0 and
∂WCrt(z,x)
∂x > 0, there exists a unique x
∗ such
that WCrt(0, x) Q WNI if and only if x Q x∗by the Intermediate Value Theorem. Then, for all
(z, x) ∈ ΩFS such that x < x∗, WCrt (z, x) < WNI since WCrt (z, x) strictly decreases in z.
Step 3: For each x > x∗ on ΩFS, there exists z∗(x) < z˜(x) such that WCrt(z, x) Q WNI if and
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only if z R z∗(x). First, let us show that limz→z˜(x) WCrt(z, x) < WNI .
lim
z→z˜(x)
WCrt (z, x)−WNI = (1/2)
[
1− (1− xγ0n¯)2
]
− xγ0n¯c¯− γ0n¯z˜(x)
−
{
(1/2)γ0
[
1− (1− n¯)2
]
− γ0n¯c¯
}
= γ0n¯
{
(1/2)
[
x2γ0n¯− (2− n¯)
]
+ c¯
}
< γ0n¯ {(1/2) [n¯− (2− n¯)] + c¯}
= −γ0n¯ (1/γ0 − 1) c¯
< 0
where the second equality follows from arranging terms; third equality follows from arranging
terms after plugging in 1− (c¯/γ0) for n¯; the first inequality follows from x2γ0 < 1. Along with
this results and the fact that WCrt(0, x) > WNI for all x > x∗, we proved the point again by the
Intermediate Value Theorem.
Step 4: From Step 2 and 3, ΩNI+ =
{
(z, x) ∈ ΩFS|z < z∗(x) and x > x∗} and ΩNI+ ( ΩFS.
Step 5: For all (z, x) ∈ ΩSS, WCrt(z, x) < WNI . The welfare was defined as the sum of con-
sumer surplus. Compared to the fully separating case, now less amount of consumers are served
in equilibrium given x while consumer valuation for the good remains the same as before so that
consumer surplus decreases. In addition to this, the aggregate expected profits are lower in semi-
separating equilibrium because by definition producers earn 0 now while their profits are posi-
tive in fully separating equilibria. In sum, WCrt(z, x) is lower than WCrt(z˜(x), x), which implies
WCrt(z, x) < WNI for all z ∈ (z˜(x), zˆ(x)) given x. 
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